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In response to the global financial turmoil and sovereign debt crisis, the European Union has 
introduced a new bail-in resolution mechanism based on the shared burden of losses between 
shareholders, debt-holders, and depositors. By focusing on the abnormal stock price reactions to 
bail-in policy announcements, this paper shows that investors perceive the new bail-in regime as 
a credible tool to decrease government interventions, reduce the too-big-to-fail problem, and 
increase market discipline in the European banking industry. 
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The Eurozone crisis has exposed the lack of a common approach to crisis management 
and resolution in banking (Caprio and Honohan, 2015). The European Union (EU) followed a 
radical re-regulation process, including the implementation of a single resolution mechanism 
(SRM) whose key feature is the bail-in rule. Under this regulation, banking losses are absorbed 
by shareholders, debt-holders, and depositors over 100 thousand Euro, following a creditor 
hierarchy principle. 
Although the bail-in regulation is a keystone for European banking, only few papers 
explore SRM and the benefits of a bail-in compared to a bailout (Papanikolaou, 2018; Avgouleas 
and Goodhart, 2015) using simulation approaches (Benczur et al., 2017) and investigating the 
role of bank business models. This paper focuses on the market reaction to the bail-in 
introduction to assess whether investors perceive this tool as a valuable resource to achieve the 
two primary purposes set by regulators: to minimize the destabilizing effect of banking crises on 
public finances and enhance market discipline. Three research hypotheses were developed to test 
a large set of regulatory announcements for European listed banks. 
𝐻")	Investors reduce expectations about future government interventions (bailouts), with a 
consequent decrease in stock prices. 
According to the too-big-to-fail (TBTF) literature (Mattana et al., 2015), the new 
resolution should severely reduce the probability of a state intervention for large institutions, 
which were more likely to receive government support in case of financial distress. However, it 
is also possible that investors are doubtful about the restriction of government interventions for 
large banking institutions and believe that these banks will be supported despite the new 
regulation (Schoenmaker, 2014). This leads to the second hypothesis: 
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𝐻%) The reaction of larger banks is stronger and more relevant with respect to other banks. 
Avgouleas and Goodhart (2015) indicate that the bail-in mechanism should incentivize 
creditors to resume a monitoring function and consequently restore market discipline. However, 
at our knowledge, there is no empirical evidence on this issue. Consistently with the market 
discipline view, the following hypothesis was tested: 
𝐻&) Bail-in enhances market discipline with stronger reaction for banks that have received 
state aid in the past and/or show weaker financial conditions. 
2. Data and methodology 
All regulatory announcements dealing with the introduction of the bail-in mechanism 
from the European Commission’s (EC) preliminary plans to the formal adoption of the Bank 
Recovery and Resolution Directive (BRRD) were collected1. Stock returns data were collected 
from Datastream and bank balance-sheet information from BankScope and Bankfocus. 
Abnormal returns (ARs) were calculated as the difference between the observed and 
expected returns, obtained through the application of a standard market model with a broad 
reference index (MSCI Europe Index) and a 252-day estimation period, which ends 20 days 
before each announcement. Cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) were estimated over different 
short event windows [i.e., (−1, 0), (−1, 1), (−1, 3), and (−3, 3)] (Fiordelisi et al., 2014). There 
were no other events of potential interest to investors in European banking (i.e., monetary policy 
interventions). 
 
1 Specifically, we analyze the following announcements: 1) Commission sets out its plans for a new EU framework 
for crisis management in the financial sector (20 October 2010); 2) Commission seeks views on possible EU 
framework to deal with future bank failures (06 January 2011); 3) New crisis management measures to avoid future 
bank bail-outs (06 June 2012); 4) Commission proposes Single Resolution Mechanism for the Banking Union (10 
July 2013); 5) The European Parliament adopts the Bank Recovery and Resolution Directive (5 April 2014); 6) The 
Bank Recovery and Resolution Directive (BRRD) applies in all Member States (01 January 2015); and 7) Single 




The following model was used to understand the main drivers of CARs (over different 
event windows t1–t2): 
𝐶𝐴𝑅*,,
-",-% = 𝛼	 + 𝛽"𝐸𝑢𝑟𝑜*,- + 𝛽%𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒*,- + 𝛽&	𝐴𝑖𝑑*,- + 𝛽;𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑏*,- + 	𝛽@𝐶𝑖𝑟*,- + 𝛽A𝐶𝑎𝑝*,-
+ 	𝛽D𝑅𝑤𝑎*,- + 𝜀*,- 
(1) 
Euro is a dummy taking the value of 1 for banks in the euro area, and 0 otherwise. Bank size 
(Size) is the natural logarithm of total assets; government aids (Aid) is a dummy taking the value 
of 1 for banks receiving financial support during the global financial crisis and 0 otherwise; Intb 
is the liquidity position on the interbank market measured by the ratio between amounts due and 
loans to banks; Cir is the level of efficiency calculated as the ratio of overhead to operating 
income; Cap is the ratio of total regulatory capital to risk-weighted assets; and Rwa is the risk-
weighted assets ratio. 
3. Results and discussion 
The event study results (mean values of CARs and p-values) are presented in Table 1. 
Considering all policy announcements, ARs are generally negative and statistically significant, 
thereby supporting the first hypothesis, H1. 
There is no significant evidence for the announcement on October 20, 2010, probably due 
to the absence of a clear definition of the resolution mechanism. Conversely, there was a 
statistically significant negative reaction on January 6, 2011, when regulators introduced the 
concept of creditors bearing losses for the first time. The subsequent interim announcements in 
2012 and 2013 were not associated with significant reactions, whereas there were some notable 
results for the formal adoption on April 15, 2014. Overall, these results are consistent with 
Schäfer et al. (2016), giving further support to H1 that investors believed the bail-in mechanism 
will reduce the probability of state aid to banks.  
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The second-stage regression model (Table 2) is consistent with the results. The focus was 
only on the dates with significant market reactions, January 6, 2011 and April 15, 2014, 
including a dummy (Ann) taking the value of 1 for the formal adoption of the BRRD. 
The coefficient for Euro is negative and statistically significant for three out of four event 
windows, consistent with a more effective application of the bail-in tool for euro area countries. 
The coefficient for Size is negative and statistically significant for three out of four event 
windows. Consistent with H2, larger banks are expected to be more negatively impacted by the 
introduction of bail-in regulation as a tool to severe the linkage between systemic banking crises 
and public interventions. 
The coefficient for Aid is negative and statistically significant for three out of four event 
windows. In accordance with H3, banks that have already received public support register a 
stronger unfavorable reaction concerning their competitors. As regards liquidity, the coefficient 
for Intb is negative and statistically significant for two event windows, signaling a higher risk for 
banks with a relevant imbalance in their funding strategy. With regard to riskiness, the 
coefficient for Rwa is always negative and statistically significant. Overall, the results provide 
strong empirical support for the hypothesis (H3). Finally, the coefficient for Ann (i.e. a dummy 
taking the value of 1 in the case of a formal adoption, and zero otherwise) is positive and 
significant, which confirms a more negative reaction for the previous announcement that 
incorporated higher surprise content (January 6, 2011). 
5. Conclusion 
This paper analyzes stock market reactions to policy announcements introducing the new 
bail-in tool based on the shared burden of losses between shareholders, debt-holders, and 
depositors. Findings from the event study analysis are consistent with the expectation that the 
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bail-in tool can reduce state aid to banks; however, our findings advance Schäfer et al. (2016) for 
at least three reasons: First, the analysis includes preliminary announcement dates, for which it is 
reasonable to expect a stronger surprise effect. Second, a larger sample was used, including listed 
banks operating outside the euro area. Third, the adjustment suggested by Kolari and Pynnönen 
(2010) was adopted to correct the significance of CARs for potential cross-correlation. 
The second-stage regression model provided two main results. First, the larger banks 
were more sensitive to the bail-in introduction, consistent with the idea that their probability to 
receive state support was higher before the imposition of the new regulation. Second, a stronger 
(negative) market reaction was found for banks that had already received state aids in the past; 
their funding was more dependent on the interbank market and presented a higher level of risk. 
Overall, the market reaction assessment revealed that investors considered the bail-in 
introduction to be a credible instrument to contain the TBTF problem, reduce state interventions 
in banking crises, and promote market discipline.  
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Table 1. Event study analysis 
This table illustrates the descriptive statistics of CARs estimated over the main EC press releases relative to the bank crisis 
management. ARs are obtained using a standard market model with a 252-day estimation period. CARs in bold are those that 
remain statistically significant considering the adjustment suggested by Kolari and Pynnönen (2010). Data are collected from 
Datastream. 
 
All dates CAR P-value 
(-1,0) -0.0081 0.0251 
(-1,1) -0.0096 0.0237 
(-1,3) -0.0101 0.0459 
(-3,3) -0.0098 0.1284 
   
20/10/2010 
EC sets out its plans for a new EU framework for crisis management  
CAR P-value 
(-1,0) 0.0051 0.4712 
(-1,1) 0.0037 0.6684 
(-1,3) 0.0050 0.6980 
(-3,3) 0.0054 0.6565 
   
06/01/2011 
EC launches a consultation on technical details 
CAR P-value 
(-1,0) -0.0110 0.1038 
(-1,1) -0.0165 0.0683 
(-1,3) -0.0226 0.0590 
(-3,3) -0.0280 0.0663 
   
06/06/2012 
EC sets new crisis management measures 
CAR P-value 
(-1,0) -0.0040 0.6881 
(-1,1) -0.0048 0.7334 
(-1,3) -0.0057 0.5745 
(-3,3) 0.0083 0.5844 
   
10/07/2013 
EC proposes SRM for the Banking Union 
CAR P-value 
(-1,0) -0.0106 0.2511 
(-1,1) -0.0100 0.3270 
(-1,3) -0.0067 0.9331 
(-3,3) -0.0084 0.9644 
   
15/04/2014 
Formal adoption by the European Parliament 
CAR P-value 
(-1,0) -0.0195 0.0077 
(-1,1) -0.0200 0.0157 
(-1,3) -0.0204 0.0152 




Table 2. Determinants of CARs 
This table illustrates empirical results from the regression models examining the determinants of CARs around the 
implementation of the new bail-in regime. Data are collected from Datastream and BankScope databases. Robust standard 
errors are in parentheses. ***, **, * denote statistically significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 car13 car10 car33 car11 
     
EUR -0.00960** -0.00717** -0.0184*** -0.00422 
 (0.00463) (0.00356) (0.00577) (0.00520) 
SIZE -0.00342*** -0.00250* -0.000994 -0.00291** 
 (0.00131) (0.00128) (0.00180) (0.00140) 
AID -0.0122** -0.00923* -0.0331*** -0.00510 
 (0.00598) (0.00494) (0.0116) (0.00710) 
INTB -0.000523** 0.000113 -0.000688** -0.000193 
 (0.000201) (0.000434) (0.000336) (0.000302) 
CIR -0.0171 -0.0125 -0.00889 -0.0130 
 (0.0131) (0.0151) (0.0175) (0.0226) 
CAP 0.0328 0.0489 0.119 -0.00593 
 (0.0594) (0.0542) (0.0869) (0.0624) 
RWA -0.0412** -0.0344** -0.0493** -0.0348* 
 (0.0164) (0.0170) (0.0215) (0.0177) 
ANN 0.0118*** -0.00461 0.0119** 0.00328 
 (0.00417) (0.00352) (0.00542) (0.00416) 
Constant 0.0679* 0.0543 0.0145 0.0628 
 (0.0379) (0.0375) (0.0535) (0.0437) 
     
Observations 199 199 199 199 
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